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Neutrality or Privilege?  
A Comment on Religious Freedom  
David M. Brown* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The critiques by Professors Richard Moon and Bruce Ryder of the 
Amselem, LaFontaine Village and Same-Sex Marriage Reference cases 
offer useful insights not only into the decisions themselves, but also into 
the continuing issues that surround an understanding of the guarantee of 
freedom of conscience and religion contained in section 2(a) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this comment I do not 
intend to deal at any length with the cases,
1
 but I propose to take up and 
examine some of the conclusions ventured by Professors Moon and 
Ryder. 
II. THE FOUR AMBIGUITIES 
Moon describes, quite accurately I think, four ambiguities character-
izing current jurisprudence under section 2(a) of the Charter: 
 
(1) does section 2(a) protect both religious and non-religious beliefs and 
practices, or does it give special constitutional protection to reli-
gious beliefs? 
(2) what wrongs are addressed by the freedom? does section 2(a) 
merely prohibit state coercion or does it preclude the state from 
supporting/favouring one religion? 
(3) what role may religion, or religiously-formed or articulated views, 
play in public debate? 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Partner, Stikeman Elliott LLP, Toronto, Ontario. 
1
  I have commented elsewhere on the decisions in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 and Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-
Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650. See David M. 
Brown, “Where Can I Pray? Sacred Space in Secular Land” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 122. 
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(4) what role does “public secularism” play in contemporary Canadian 
politics and jurisprudence? Is secularism the safe harbour of neutral-
ity or is it a partisan principle?  
These ambiguities provide a good working framework in which to con-
sider the issues of religious liberty raised in the cases.  
III. THE FIRST AMBIGUITY: WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF  
SECTION 2(A)? DOES IT ACCORD SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 
In Amselem, Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, stated that in in-
terpreting of the scope of freedom of religion the emphasis is on “per-
sonal choice of religious beliefs,” and, as a result: 
In my opinion, these decisions and commentary should not be 
construed to imply that freedom of religion protects only those aspects 
of religious belief or conduct that are objectively recognized by 
religious experts as being obligatory tenets or precepts of a particular 
religion. Consequently, claimants seeking to invoke freedom of 
religion should not need to prove the objective validity of their beliefs 
in that their beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by other 




As Moon correctly observes, the majority’s understanding of which 
religious beliefs attract the protection of section 2(a) differs from that 
found in the minority judgment authored by Bastarache J. which reflects 
a more prescriptive, hierarchical view of religious belief. Moon charac-
terizes the majority’s approach as a Protestant conception of religious 
belief; there is certainly truth in this observation, although I would liken 
the approach more to that taken by Henry James in his 1901-1902 
Gifford Lectures, subsequently published under the title, The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, where James ventured a psychological defini-
tion of religion as “the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men 
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation 
                                                                                                                                
2
  Amselem, id., at para. 43. 
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to whatever they may consider the divine.”3 James regarded the reli-
gious experience of the individual as primary; religious life derived 
from the teaching of a community or church was quite secondary to 
him.
4
 For James, the real locus of religion is in individual experience, 
and not in corporate life.
5
  
Since under the majority’s approach in Amselem freedom of religion 
protects religious beliefs and practices that are both obligatory and non-
obligatory, Moon queries whether such an analytical approach results in 
“special constitutional treatment” being accorded to religious beliefs and 
practices. Towards the end of his paper Moon puts it this way: 
If religious commitment is a matter of individual choice, can it also be 
fundamental (a part of the individual’s identity or “self-definition”) 
and can it be distinguished from personal, deeply held, non-religious 
views? If freedom of religion is about individual autonomy, rather 
than cultural identity, it is difficult to explain why non-religious 
beliefs, which are also the product of individual choice or judgment, 
should not receive the same protection as religious beliefs/practices. It 
is also difficult to explain why public and private actors should 
sometimes be required to compromise their pursuit of legitimate 
purposes to accommodate minority religious practices. Or, from the 
other direction, it is difficult to explain why freedom of religion should 
protect more than the individual’s liberty to make and follow moral 




Moon poses a valid question about the content of freedom of con-
science under the Charter — a question infrequently faced by courts in 
cases brought before them — but I take issue with the suggestion im-
plicit in his analysis that protecting non-mandatory religious practices 
strays beyond the proper bounds of section 2(a) of the Charter or in 
some way privileges religious conscientious belief over non-religious 
                                                                                                                                
3
  N. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), at 
31. 
4
  C. Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), at 4. 
5
  Id., at 7. 
6
  Richard Moon, “The Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem” on page 1 of this volume. 
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conscientious belief. Let me offer three observations about Moon’s 
approach. 
1. Dealing with Religion on its own Terms 
For the constitutional protection of religious belief and practice to 
offer tangible protection to the believer, judges and lawyers must be 
prepared to understand religion on its own terms. This is no easy task in 
this day and age when popular culture has become increasingly irreli-
gious. It should come as no surprise then that often the law succumbs to 
a temptation to re-fashion religion in its own image, regarding its es-
sence as constituting nothing more than a system of rules and obligations 
similar to those found in legal systems. If the scope of freedom of religion 
runs no further than protecting the fulfillment of obligations a religion 
calls its faithful to perform, then courts face an easier adjudicative task 
in determining whether or not a claimant’s call for protection under 
section 2(a) merits relief. Prove to us, the court can then say, that the 
legal burden of which you complain interferes with an obligation your 
religion imposes, and we will grant you a remedy; but if that of which 
you complain does not touch upon a matter of obligation, then we will 
not regard it as a matter of religious belief or practice worthy of protec-
tion. At its roots, this seems to be the approach favoured by the minority 
in Amselem who would have required a demonstrable connection be-
tween a religious “precept” and the religious practice in question in 
order to “establish the mandatory nature of his or her religious prac-
tice.”7 
Alluring as the forensic simplicity of the minority’s approach might 
be, in my view it fails to address religion on its own terms, a challenge 
more successfully met by Iacobucci J.’s conceptualization of religious 
belief. To illustrate why, I wish to consider two examples of religious 
practices. For ease of illustration the practices are taken from Roman 
Catholicism since, with the publication in 1992 of the Catechism of the 
                                                                                                                                
7
  Amselem, supra, note 1, at para. 138. The minority then continued at para. 139:  
The first step of the analysis therefore consists in examining the belief of a claimant 
who adopts a particular religious practice in accordance with the rites prescribed by his or 
her religion. To this end, evidence must be introduced to establish the nature of the belief or 
conviction, that is, to determine upon what religious precept the belief or conviction is 
based… 
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Catholic Church, one can access easily that church’s beliefs and their 
links with religious practice.  
In Big M Drug Mart Dickson C.J. characterized the essence of free-
dom of religion in the following terms: 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare 
religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and 
the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by 
teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that 
… 
Freedom means that…no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to 
his beliefs or his conscience.
8
 
Assume, then, the most extreme form of legal violation of religious 
freedom — the enactment of a hypothetical law that would proscribe 
specified religious practices. Imagine that one provision of the law 
would forbid attendance at Sunday Mass, while another would prohibit 
praying the Rosary
9
 in public. Would part or all of such a law violate a 
Catholic’s freedom of religion guaranteed by section 2(a) of the Char-
ter? 
Under the approach of the Amselem majority both provisions of the 
law would run afoul of section 2(a). That likely would not be the case 
under the minority’s approach. The proscription against attending Mass 
on Sunday would violate section 2(a) since one could point to the Cate-
chism’s use of the language of “precept” when speaking of an obligation 
on the faithful to attend Mass on Sundays.
10
 But what of publicly pray-
ing the Rosary? The Catechism states that the Church “proposes to the 
faithful certain rhythms of praying”11 and “invites the faithful to regular 
                                                                                                                                
8
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at paras. 94-95. 
9
  Popularly tracing its origins to St. Dominic Guzman in the 13th Century, the Rosary 
consists of a combination of vocal and mental prayer, centring around meditations on the birth, life, 
passion and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
10
  In fact the Catechism talks of “precepts” in respect of only five practices: attendance at 
Sunday Mass; confessing sins once a year; receiving Holy Communion during Easter; keeping holy 
days of obligation; and observing the prescribed days of fasting and abstinence. Catechism, at 
paras. 2041-43. 
11
  Catechism, at para. 2698. 
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prayer.”12 There is no precept or express obligation imposed to pray, as 
there is to attend weekly Mass, but the Catechism provides that “prayer 
and Christian life are inseparable.”13 While the Catechism describes 
several types of prayer, it does not contain an express command or obli-
gation for the faithful to pray any particular prayer, such as the Rosary. 
In the absence of language of precept or obligation, an argument could 
be made that under the Amselem minority’s analysis prayer is not a 
practice of a “mandatory nature” that would attract the protection of 
section 2(a), yet it would be difficult to conceive of leading a Catholic 
life without engaging in prayer.
14
 
By reducing protected religious belief and practice to the adherence 
to binding obligations the minority in Amselem ignored much of what 
constitutes religious practice in the day-to-day lives of religious adher-
ents. While some religions may specify a group of mandatory practices, 
most religions exhort their faithful to demonstrate their piety, and their 
desire to achieve the holy, by engaging in practices that go well beyond 
any set of obligatory rules. The legal protection offered by the minority 
in Amselem would stop precisely where the richness of religious life 
begins.  
2. Applying a Consistent Analytical Approach to Fundamental 
Freedoms 
A second concern I have with Moon’s criticism that the Amselem 
majority’s scope of religious freedom risks creating a privileged place 
for religious belief is its implicit departure from the analytical tech-
niques that the Court has brought to interpreting the scope of fundamen-
tal freedoms contained in the Charter. Freedom of expression, for 
example, has been defined broadly to encompass all forms of expressive 
activity save those that involve violence.
15
 The simple right to vote 
found in section 3 has been expanded generously by the Court to include 
                                                                                                                                
12
  Id., at para. 2720. 
13
  Id., at para. 2757. 
14
  In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman, [1994] O.J. No. 1864, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 449 
(Gen. Div.) the court rejected an argument that an injunction against a woman protesting against 
abortion by praying on the sidewalk in front of an abortion clinic would violate her s. 2(a) rights. 
The court concluded that the protest activity she engaged in was not one shared by the vast majority 
of her co-religionists and therefore not protected by s. 2(a). 
15
  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
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the right to “effective representation”16 and to “meaningful participation 
in free and fair elections.”17 In light of the broad, expansive approaches 
taken to the interpretation of the scope of other fundamental freedoms, it 
would seem highly incongruous to suggest that courts should shift gears 
and adopt a minimalist approach to interpreting the scope of freedom of 
religion under section 2(a).  
3. Comparison with the Scope of “Freedom of …Conscience” 
Moon questions the scope of the protection for religious freedom 
developed by Iacobucci J. in Amselem by speculating that “it is difficult 
to see how a court could take such a broad approach to freedom of con-
science and extend protection to any belief/practice that an individual 
might consider important or valuable, but not obligatory.” He continues: 
It simply cannot be the case that any practice (not tied to a religious 
belief system) that an individual considers important but not morally 
necessary, is protected under the Charter and subject to restriction by 
the state only on substantial and compelling grounds.
18
  
It is useful for Moon to remind readers that section 2(a) consists of a 
double-protection: freedom of conscience and religion. But I question 
whether the majority decision in Amselem really permits him to specu-
late as he has. 
Twenty-three years after the enactment of the Charter it remains true 
that few cases have called on the courts to interpret the scope of “free-
dom of conscience,” and those that have ventured an interpretation of 
the clause did so in obiter. In Big M Drug Mart,
19
 the Court drew upon 
the historical link between freedom of conscience and the freedom to 
dissent from the established religion to hold that section 2(a) of the 
Charter protects not only the right to hold and manifest religious beliefs, 
but also the right to hold and manifest non-belief and to refuse to partic-
ipate in religious practice. In Morgentaler
20
 Wilson, J. stated that “…it 
                                                                                                                                
16
  Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 158. 
17
  Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912. 
18
  Supra, note 6. 
19
  Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 8, at para. 123. 
20
  R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
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would be my view that conscientious beliefs which are not religiously 
motivated are equally protected by freedom of conscience in  
s. 2(a).”21 In her view, integral to a free and democratic society is the 
existence of “…the background conditions under which individual citi-
zens may pursue the ethical values which in their view underlie the good 
life.”22 Accordingly,  
 It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society 
“freedom of conscience and religion” should be broadly construed to 
extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion or 
in a secular morality. Indeed, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
“conscience” and “religion” should not be treated as tautologous if 
capable of independent, although related, meaning.
23
 
Beyond these two cases the Supreme Court offers little further assis-
tance on the meaning of “freedom of conscience,” and the offerings by 
the lower courts are also few in number.
24
 However, the broad interpre-
tation of freedom of conscience favoured by Wilson J. in Morgentaler 
inclines closer to the approach of Iacobucci J. in Amselem than to 
Moon’s conjecture of a limited interpretation of that freedom.  
In the result, of course, one just cannot say how the Supreme Court 
might interpret “freedom of conscience” in a case where the outcome 
would turn on such an interpretation because no case has yet arisen. One 
can say, however, that in the cases to date the Supreme Court has 
viewed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion as distinct, but 
closely related, concepts. In Big M Drug Mart Dickson C.J. stated: “Re-
ligious belief and practice are historically prototypical and, in many 
ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations 
                                                                                                                                
21
  Id., at para. 251. 
22
  Id., at para. 252. 
23
  Id., at para. 253. 
24
  In Re MacKay v. Manitoba, [1985] M.J. No. 164, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 587 (C.A.); affd on 
other grounds, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, the Manitoba Court of Appeal comment-
ed that the freedom of conscience protected by s. 2(a) involved the absence of coercion or con-
straint by the state relating to self-judgment on the moral quality of one’s conduct or lack of it; 
disapproval of the thoughts or conduct of another is not a matter of conscience. In Ontario (Attor-
ney General) v. Dieleman, supra, note 14, the Ontario Court, General Division offered that freedom 
of conscience was not intended to protect all actions that might be said to be motivated by con-
science, and the court concluded that the effect of an injunction against protest activity outside an 
abortion clinic would not be to conscript a person to a cause offensive to her conscience. 
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and are therefore protected by the Charter.”25 In view of this, in my view 
the more appropriate working assumption should be that the Court 
would apply a similar approach to interpreting the scope of freedom of 
conscience as it did to freedom of religion in Amselem, rather than con-
jecture that freedom of conscience will receive the short end of the stick 
while freedom of religion will obtain a privileged status.  
I concur with Ryder’s observation that “reference to conscience 
must add something to s. 2(a); it must lead to constitutional protection 
of some non-religious belief systems.” Moon, concerned about the 
open-endedness of possible judicial protection of non-religious con-
science claims seems to doubt that courts would act to embrace such 
claims with any eagerness; Ryder demurs, arguing that “not all beliefs 
or opinions can qualify as matters of conscience.” I am inclined to think 
that Ryder’s distinction is correct and workable, but the concerns raised 
by Moon rightly point to the need to think in more depth about the scope 
of freedom of conscience, its practical manifestation in individual con-
duct and the extent to which the Charter offers protection against state 
action materially affecting such conduct. 
IV. RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY  
The remaining three ambiguities described by Moon are closely 
linked: one’s view of the secular, or secularism, likely will inform one’s 
conception of the appropriate state stance vis-à-vis religion, and in turn 
influence one’s position on whether it is legitimate to permit a religious 
voice in public, liberal democratic debate. The case released contempo-
raneously with Amselem — the decision in LaFontaine Village26 — 
touched, in its minority judgment, on the question of state neutrality, 
and Ryder’s paper tackles the implications of that principle for the rela-
tionship between state action and religions. 
Before turning to the notion raised by LeBel J. in his minority 
judgment in Lafontaine Village that the state must act as a neutral inter-
mediary with respect to religion, it is worth first considering the popular 
conception that the secular (and its surrogate the state) stands in contrast 
to the religious. We tend to describe public, political life as secular in 
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  Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 8, at para. 123. 
26
  Supra, note 1. 
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character. This has two consequences. First, such a characterization 
leads easily to an implicit assumption that things religious stand outside, or 
apart from, matters of the here-and-now that form the objects of concern of 
the secular state. While it is quite true that many, if not most, religions 
formulate their ultimate ends in terms of things spiritual or eternal, it is 
not true to paint religions as eschewing matters of the temporal, material 
world.  
Iain Benson has written frequently on the analytical distortions that 
may result from an incorrect understanding of the secular,
27
 noting that 
in its origins the secular identified a worldly realm, but not one stripped 
of religious significance. That the secular does not exclude the religious 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Chamberlain
28
 
case where the Court held that a provision of the British Columbia 
School Act requiring that schools must be conducted on “strictly secu-
lar…principles” did not preclude decisions motivated by religious con-
siderations
29
 but did require decisions that took into account all points of 
view. Justice Gonthier put the matter succinctly in his dissenting judg-
ment: 
 In my view, Saunders J. below erred in her assumption that 
“secular” effectively meant “non-religious”. This is incorrect since 
nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper 
understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral 




The second consequence of characterizing political life as secular 
concerns the ease with which conflating the secular with the non-
religious leads readily to the notion that the state espouses policies that 
are neutral in content and therefore somehow of a higher order than 
policies grounded on religious understandings. As Benson quite accu-
rately notes, the state is not agnostic regarding metaphysical claims: 
                                                                                                                                
27
  See, e.g., I. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the ‘Secular’” (2000) 33 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 519, and “The Secular: Hidden and Express Meanings” (2002) 9 Sacred Web 125. 
28
  Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
710. 
29
  Chamberlain, id., at para. 59. 
30
  Id., at para. 137. 
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The term “secular” has come to mean a realm that is neutral or, more 
precisely, “religion-free”. Implicit in this religion free neutrality is the 
notion that the secular is a realm of facts distinct from the realm of 
faith. This understanding, however, is in error. Parse historically the 
word “secular” and one finds that secular means something like non-
sectarian or focused on this world, on “non-faith”. States cannot be 
neutral towards metaphysical claims. Their very inaction towards 
certain claims operates as an affirmation of others. This realization of 
the faith-based nature of all decisions will be important as the courts 




Ryder, too, points out that “there is no such thing as a point of view 
from nowhere.” Echoing Jaroslav Pelikan’s analogy of the courts in 
democratic constitutional regimes to religious teaching authorities,
32
 
Ryder observes:  
Secular constitutional documents like the Charter are political 
expressions of a particular philosophy about religion and life…The 
Charter is, in many important ways, the nation’s new secular religion, 
establishing the fundamental norms with which all laws and public 
policies must comply. 
Corroborative evidence for the “faith dimension” of the Charter can 
be found in a remarkable paper presented a few years ago by McLachlin 
C.J. at a conference at McGill University where she boldly made a 
“faith claim” for the “rule of law” when she cited with approval Chicago 
School of Law Professor Paul Kahn who described, “the rule of law as a 
comprehensive system of belief: ‘there is not part of modern life’ Kahn 
explains “to which law does not extend.”33  
The Chief Justice contended that “the authority claimed by law 
touches upon all aspects of human life and citizenship …Voting, taxa-
tion, mobility, family organization, and public discourse: the rule of law 
                                                                                                                                
31
  Benson, supra, note 27, at 520. 
32
  J. Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), at 
58. 
33
  “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: the Canadian Perspective”, in D. Farrow 
(ed.), Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), at 14. 
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leaves no aspect of human experience unaffected by its claim to authori-
ty.”34  
Just as when the Tudor monarchs fused state power with religious 
authority in the person of the sovereign, leaving dissenters to face the 
double-barrelled allegations of heretic and traitor, one may ask what 
place the religious “dissenters” in today’s Canada would occupy under a 
“comprehensive system of belief” of the “rule of law”? Ryder insight-
fully points out that a conflict between the faith of the Charter and other 
faiths may be avoided if one gives greater consideration to the “rule of 
law’s” twin foundational principle enshrined in the preamble of the 
Charter — the supremacy of God. Describing the preamble as “an inter-
pretive opportunity thus far missed,” Ryder ventures that the preamble 
represents a “kind of secular humility, a recognition that there are other 
truths, other sources of competing world-views, of normative and au-
thoritative communities that are profound sources of meaning in peo-
ple’s lives that ought to be nurtured as counter-balances to state 
authority.” Commentary on the significance of these dual foundational 
principles in the Charter’s preamble remains sparse,35 but the force with 
which the courts are asserting a Charter-metaphysics calls for a timely, 
and more profound, reflection on the interaction between the “secular” 
faith of the rule of law and the faith of religious citizens, for the two are 
not necessarily opposed.  
In the Lafontaine Villiage decision, Bastarache J., writing for a mi-
nority of four judges, posited that under the Charter the state must stand 
in the position of a “neutral intermediary” towards religion in the sense 
that the state must refrain from implementing measures that could fa-
vour one religion over another or that might simply have the effect of 
imposing one particular religion.
36
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, in his engag-
ing debate with Robert Audi in Religion in the Public Square,
37
 criti-
cized Audi’s articulation of state neutrality towards religion on precisely 
                                                                                                                                
34
  Id. 
35
  L. Sossin, “The ‘Supremacy of God’, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227; I. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the ‘Secular’” 
(2000) 33 U.B.C.L. Rev. 519; D.M. Brown, “Freedom From or Freedom For?: Religion as a Case 
Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33 U.B.C.L. Rev. 551. 
36
  Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 560, at paras. 73-78. 
37
  R. Audi and N. Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious 
Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). 
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this point. Audi argued that the liberal democratic principle of separa-
tion of church and state encompassed both principles of the equal treat-
ment of all religions by the state and of neutrality, under which the state 
neither favours nor disfavours religion as such.
38
 Wolterstorff extended 
the neutrality principle so that it requires an even hand by the state as 
between religious and non-religious comprehensive perspectives.
39
 As 
Benson has observed, even non-religious claims to action involve meta-
physical assertions that we do not empirically prove, reflecting a form of 
“natural” or non-religious faith. Under such conditions, it is highly mis-
leading to suggest that states can be neutral towards metaphysical 
claims: state policy results from the selection of some “faith claim.”40 
Ryder expresses concern about the innovative aspect of LeBel J.’s 
opinion in extending the duty of religious neutrality to require that the 
state remains neutral about the value of religion generally. This, in his 
view, marks a step in the wrong direction. Ryder argues that the struc-
ture and content of the Charter support an interpretation under which the 
state fosters “a religiously-positive pluralism.” I think Ryder fairly ques-
tions this aspect of the judgment. Freedom of religion enjoys a place as 
one of the fundamental freedoms in the Charter, from which it is rea-
sonable to infer that religion is a “public good” within the Charter’s 
realm. Whether one can take the next step, as Ryder has, and draw from 
the Charter an obligation on the state to foster “a religiously-positive 
pluralism” I think requires further consideration. Arguably a state posi-
tion of “no burden; no privilege” towards religion, for example, would 
respect the text of the Charter without raising the danger of state or 
judicial entanglement in religious affairs that might accompany even a 
well-intentioned “religiously-positive pluralism.” 
This then takes us to Moon’s final ambiguity — the place of reli-
gion in public debate and decision-making. As he puts the matter: 
The courts remain uncertain whether religious belief should be seen as 
contestable opinion/judgment, an ordinary part of public debate and 
decision-making, or whether it should be seen as a matter of personal 
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or cultural identity, as non-rational, and therefore outside the scope of 
legitimate public debate and action.
41
  
Although the Supreme Court in Chamberlain clearly held that reli-
gious views may be voiced in public debates (in that case before a local 
board of education), there is no doubt that John Rawls’ argument in 
favour of “public reason” under which it is impermissible to argue from 
religious premises to political conclusions still casts a deep shadow over 
this issue.
42
 It is far from clear why non-religious arguments, in the 
absence of some rigorous epistemology (which many seem to lack), 
should enjoy any a priori claim to reasonableness or rationality over 
religious arguments;
43
 or why arguments based on reason and religion 
necessarily are inconsistent or incompatible with each other;
44
 or why 
courts should adopt a principle of “public reason” that by its very nature 
is anti-Charter in that it restricts and reduces the kinds of arguments that 
can be voiced on matters of public debate. Moon does well to identify 
these tensions, and they merit more detailed consideration by all in the 
years to come. 
V. CLOSING COMMENTS: IDENTITY AND CULTURE 
In concluding his paper Moon observes that religious belief and 
practice often combine choices freely made and the influence of cultural 
factors. Quite so. But he then proceeds to erect a dichotomy of sorts 
between the two: 
The challenge for the courts is to fit this ambiguous, or complex, 
conception of religious commitment, and individual agency, into a 
rights model that distinguishes between choices that are protected as 
matters of human liberty (subject to the rights and interests of others) 
and (immutable/unchangeable) traits or attributes that must be 
respected as part of a commitment to human equality.
45
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Moon seems to advance a paradigm that suggests if religious prac-
tice is protected under section 2(a) it may be subject to limitation, but if 
protected under section 15 (an immutable/unchangeable trait) it may 
not. I question the utility and textual soundness of this paradigm, for two 
reasons. First, as a matter of the text of the Charter, religion finds ex-
press protection under both section 2(a) and section 15; to set up some 
kind of dichotomy simply runs counter to the constitutional text. Second, 
the freedoms protected by section 2 and the equality rights guaranteed by 
section 15 are both subject to limitation under section 1 of the Charter 
— grounding a claim in section 15 does not free a claimant from the 
ability of the community, through the government, to seek to place a 
reasonable limit on the equality claim. The challenge, as I see it, is to 
develop a jurisprudence of limitation under section 1 that is sensitive to 
the centrality to human existence and dignity of conscientious convic-
tion, and practice based on such conviction.  
 
